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I. INTRODUCTION 
The mainspring of an economy’s growth and take-off continues to puzzle economists. 
Even though, thanks to years of sustained research, many of the pieces of the jigsaw 
puzzle are in place, it remains very difficult to predict when an economy that has 
floundered for decades might suddenly take off. The economy, embedded as it is in 
politics, culture and institutions, is a sufficiently complex organism for this not to be 
surprising. However, growth tends to beget growth, though of course missteps can bring 
it to a halt. Hence, our understanding of an economy’s rapid growth has to focus largely 
on what causes the first stirrings.  
What this paper attempts is to analyze and understand the constellation of forces that 
have determined the growth performance of the Indian economy, including its long 
period of hibernation and sudden, recent show of dynamism. The first task in such an 
undertaking is to get the facts right. Over the last four or five years India has been getting 
a better press than ever before, since its independence in 1947. Is this good press really 
justified? If the economy is growing faster, when did the take-off occur? This is 
important to investigate not just to satisfy idle curiosity but to understand the various 
forces that may have triggered the dynamism; and that in turn is important so as to craft 
policies to sustain the growth and spread its spoils more evenly across the population. 
Part II of the paper presents the broad macro parameters of growth of the Indian economy 
since its independence and also a cross country evaluation of where India stands. It then 
goes on to discuss the broad patterns that one discerns in these aggregative statistics 
pertaining to India, including the sectoral statistics, and gives a brief overview of the on-
going debate on the components of the Indian growth and the relative importance of the 
different policies in 1980s and 1990s. Part III tries to contribute to this debate by 
identifying the landmark years, and analysing the politics that occurred behind the scenes, 
and the extent to which it helped or hindered economic progress. Part IV looks at a 
critical microeconomic component of the overall growth— labor market behaviour, and 
is followed by a brief concluding section--Part V.  
 
II. GROWTH: TRENDS AND PATTERNS  
 
II.2   Backdrop 
 
Thanks to a long history of data collection, the basic numbers of the Indian economy are, 
for a poor country, well documented. At the time of its independence, India had a literacy 
rate of 18%, an investment rate of around 9% of its GDP, life expectancy at birth of 
around 32 years, annual population growth rate of around 1.25%, and an average annual 
growth rate of GDP around 3%. In 2005-06, India had a literacy rate of around 60%, an 
investment rate of around 30% of its GDP, life expectancy at birth of around 63 years,   3 
annual population growth rate of around 1.5%, and an annual growth rate of GDP around 
8.4%.
1  
Given that the focus of the paper is on growth, let us take a look at GDP growth and 
growth rate as displayed in Figure 1 and Table 1. We have graphed the natural log of the 
GDP, rather than the actual GDP, so that one can read the growth rate directly from the 
slope of the graph. A straight line represents a constant rate of growth. Table 1 presents 
annual averages of growth rates and averages over plan periods. 
 
Figure 1 
























































































Source: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy. 2006. Reserve Bank of India (Table 2 - old series 
base: 1993-94).  
Without going into any detailed analysis as yet, by just eyeballing the data in Table 1, it 
seems that the rate of growth in the 1950s, 60s and 70s has been fluctuating around 
3.5%per annum, the so-called “Hindu rate of growth”
2. With an average annual rate of 
population growth of around 1.9%, this results in an average annual growth in per-capita 
growth rate GDP of around 1.6%. From the mid 1970s-80s onwards, the rate of growth 
exhibits an upward trend, averaging around 6% for the period 1980-2005.  
 
                                                 
1 Sources, respectively: Selected Education Statistics (age 15 and above), Ministry of Human Resource 
Development, from Indiastat; Table 1; Age-Group Wise Expectation of Life in India, Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare, from Indiastat; Dyson, Cassen and Visaria (2004) Table 2.1. p 20; Table 1; Estimated 
literacy rate age 15 and above of UNESCO; Table 1; World Development Indicators 2006, World Bank; 
Dyson, Cassen and Visaria (2004) Table 2.1. p 20; Table 1.  
 
2 Hindu rate of growth is the tongue-in-cheek expression, coined by the Indian economist, the late Raj 
Krishna, to capture the frustrations India’s planners faced with growth. No matter what they did, growth 
seemed, invariably, to revert back to 3.5% per annum, almost as if this magic figure was written in the 
land’s scriptures.  The possibility of Hinduism having something to do with economic growth was earlier 
suggested by B.P. R. Vithal.     4 
Table 1  
Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP and Gross Capital Formation, 1950-2006 
 
Year  Annual Growth 







of GDP at 
Factor Cost)  
Year  Annual Growth 






of GDP at 
Factor Cost) 
1950-51     9.07  1980-81  7.2  22.45 
1951-52  2.3  11.59  1981-82  6  22.34 
1952-53  2.8  8.32  1982-83  3.1  21.79 
1953-54  6.1  8.08  1983-84  7.7  20.69 
1954-55  4.2  10.04  1984-85  4.3  22.16 
1955-56  2.6  13.64  Average  5.6   
Average  3.6    1985-86  4.5  24.2 
1956-57  5.7  15.76  1986-87  4.3  23.47 
1957-58  -1.2  14.73  1987-88  3.8  25.23 
1958-59  7.6  12.64  1988-89  10.5  26.48 
1959-60  2.2  13.36  1989-90  6.7  27.23 
Average  3.5    Average  5.9   
1960-61  7.1  15.23  1990-91  5.6  29.27 
1961-62  3.1  14.18  1991-92  1.3  25 
1962-63  2.1  15.95  1992-93  5.1  26.25 
1963-64  5.1  15.31  1993-94  5.9  25.39 
1964-65  7.6  15.26  1994-95  7.3  28.72 
Average  5.0    Average  5.0   
1965-66  -3.7  17.47  1995-96  7.3  29.77 
1966-67  1  18.19  1996-97  7.8  26.94 
1967-68  8.1  15.17  1997-98  4.8  26.94 
1968-69  2.6  14.23  1998-99  6.5  24.59 
1969-70  6.5  15.99  1999-00  6.1  28.43 
Average  2.8    Average  6.5   
1970-71  5  16.68  2000-01  4.4  26.37 
1971-72  1  17.46  2001-02  5.8  24.97 
1972-73  -0.3  16.53  2002-03  3.8  27.51 
1973-74  4.6  18.81  2003-04  8.5  29.57 
1974-75  1.2  18.28  2004-05  7.5  33.04 
Average  2.3    Average  6.0   
1975-76  9  18.79  2005-06  9.0*   
1976-77  1.2  19.78  2006-07  9.2*   
1977-78  7.5  20.11       
1978-79  5.5  23.85       
1979-80  -5.2  22.85       
  3.5         
Per 5 Year Plan Periods 
I. 1951-56             
1I. 1956-61           
III. 1961-66         
IV. 1969-74         















Source: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy. 2006. Reserve Bank of India (Table 1 and Table 
237). Notes:  Up to 1999-00 old series (base: 1993-94). From 2000-01 onwards new series (base: 1999-
2000). Averages: authors’ own calculations.  
*Latest estimates, released by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2006-07   5 
 
To get a basic idea of the absolute numbers involved, Table 2 gives the size of the Indian 
population, the real GDP (at market prices) and the real GDP per capita (at market 
prices). The key difference between the GDP at factor costs and the GDP at market prices 
is that the latter includes indirect taxes net of subsidies. As the latter is considered a better 
measure of the standard of living, we have opted to report the absolute figures of the 
GDP and GDP per capita at market prices.   
 
Table 2 
Population, GDP and GDP per Capita at Market Prices, Selected Years 
 
Year  Population (in 
millions 
GDP (in millions 
constant 2000 US$) 
GDP per Capita 
(constant 2000 US$) 
1960  435  76,283  175 
1965  487  91,054  187 
1970  548  113,606  207 
1975  613  130,913  213 
1980  687  152,621  222 
1985  765  198,167  259 
1990  850  268,023  316 
1995  932  345,394  371 
2000  1,016  457,377  450 
2005  1,095  641,926  586 
Source: World Development Indicators 2006. World Bank 
 
From Table 2 it is clear that while the Indian population has more than doubled since the 
1960s, GDP has increased more than eightfold since then. As the population figures for 
India are based on projections from Census of India data
3, we have opted not to show the 
entire time series for population or GDP per capita.  
To conclude this introduction, let us ask one more factual question, how has India done 
vis-à-vis other nations, especially other developing countries? Has it really done better or 
is it simply the fact of a large country beginning to grow that has caught the media’s 
attention and imagination?  
In order to answer this question we assembled the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)-
corrected national income and per capita national income data of the World Bank for a 
109 countries.
4 There was a trade-off involved. As one goes further back, data, especially 
when we want it PPP-corrected, gets sparse and more and more countries have to be left 
out. We chose to go back to 1975, when the PPP corrected data became available for the 
first time. There are 109 countries for which data are available without break from that 
                                                 
3 The first census of India was carried out throughout the 1860s and completed in 1871. Since then there 
have been 13 more censuses, one per decade, the latest one being the 2001 census. 
4 The PPP corrected GDP takes into account the difference in prices of goods and services between 
countries. As the exchange rate only takes into account the differences in tradable goods and services and 
several countries have non-market based exchange rate determination, it is arguable that the PPP allows us 
to make more meaningful comparisons of standards of living across countries.   6 
year to current times. For each year, since 1975, we ranked these 109 countries based on 
PPP-corrected GDP and per capita GDP.  
From this assembled data set (not shown here) it is clear that not only has the country 
done better over time vis-à-vis itself but even in comparison to others. In terms of GDP 
per capita, India ranked 90
th among these nations in 1975. The rank fluctuated a little 
between 1975 and 1982, falling to 93
rd and rising again to 90
th. From 1982 onwards there 
has been a steady and monotonic improvement, with India’s per capita GDP (PPP 
corrected), rising to 75
th rank in 2004. There are two or three countries that did better 
than India over this period, the most notable being China, which was 108
th among the 109 
countries in 1975 but had risen to a rank of 58
th by 2004. But, as follows from the fact of 
rank improvement, India crossed over numerous nations during the last three decades.  
In terms of GDP ranking the improvement has also been marked, though this is tempered 
by the fact that some of the poorer economies have had a faster growth of population, 
especially over the last two decades. In 1985 India’s PPP-corrected GDP was the 8
th 
largest in the world, and by 2004 it was the fourth largest, with only the USA, China and 
Japan ahead.
5     
Despite this rank improvement, India and South Asia in general are still among the 
poorest regions in the world (see Table 3). Indeed, a quick look at one of the most 
important development indicators, the population below the poverty line shows us that 
despite the decline in poverty headcount ratio, from 55% in 1973-74 to 29% in 1998-99, 
India still accounts for a large absolute number of poor people, close to 30 million in 
2000.
6 
      
Table 3 
GDP per Capita (2000 constant dollars), Selected Comparisons 
 
  1965  1970  1980  1990  1995  2000  2004 
India  187  207  222  316  371  450  538 
Sub-Saharan Africa  485  536  577  520  484  504  537 
South Asia  197  220  234  326  377  446  522 
East Asia and Pacific  145  176  273  481  735  952  1254 
Latin America and Caribbean  2276  2616  3568  3262  3555  3854  3906 
World  2843  3316  3974  4555  4748  5237  5516 
Source: World Development Indicators 2006, World Bank. Note: The East-Asia and Pacific, Latin America 
and Caribbean aggregates do not contain the High Income countries.    
 
This change in India’s growth rate and improved economic performance vis-à-vis other 
nations triggered off a change in global perception not just in academic writing, but in the 
                                                 
5 If India’s rank is measured in GDP (constant 2000 international dollars), India ranks 13.  
6 Sources: Handbook of Statistics of the Indian Economy 2005-2006. Table 172. Reserve Bank of India and 
NSS 55
th Round Official Estimates. Note that the measurement of poverty has been a hotly debated subject 
especially since the 55
th round of the National Sample Survey tried to change the reference period of 
household consumption (see Deaton and Drèze, 2002; Himanshu and Sen, 2005; Lancaster and Ray, 2005; 
Subramanian, 2006, Chapter 10).    7 
media and popular business publications, that India was a newly emerging and dynamic 
economy and, in very recent years, it has been repeatedly compared to China
7. This was 
unthinkable to most India watchers even a decade ago. This popular celebration of the 
economy gives rise to a host of questions. While the strengthening of the growth rate is 
beyond doubt, the recorded overall growth rate is not the only indicator one uses to judge 
an economy and so the question arises as to whether the fundamentals are as strong as the 
media make them out to be. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the economy? Is 
there reason to expect that the growth will be sustained? What are the right policies for 
sustaining the high growth and spreading its spoils better among the population? Even 
though growth is higher, can we pin down when exactly the breaks occurred?  
II.2   Growth Patterns and Hypotheses 
Turning to details of the growth performance, let us take another look at the growth rate 
of the GDP in Figure 2 and Table 1. Observe that the spikes in annual growth rates have 
not changed very much over the years; it is the downturns that have become less severe 
and frequent. Before 1980, there were four years when the GDP recorded negative 
growth rates: 1957-58, 65-66, 72-73, and 79-80. Since 1980 never has the economy, as 
measured by GDP, shrunk in any year, though per capita GDP fell once—during 1990-
91—caused by the first Gulf War and a sharp decline in remittances and exports. GDP 
grew slowly that year but by less than the population growth. 
 
Due to the huge amount of noise the trends are not too evident to the naked eye. But once 
we smoothen out these annual fluctuations and look, instead, at averages of several years 
of growth (see Table 1), a pattern emerges. The average growth holds steady till about the 
mid-seventies and then, somewhere after that, it begins to move up and that upward 
incline has persisted till current times. This is corroborated by the average, annual growth 
rate figures for each of the five-year plan periods. Average annual growth broke the 5% 
mark for the first time during the Fifth Plan period, 1974-79, and has never dropped 
below that. The sharp spike occurred during the Eighth Plan period, 1992-97, when 
annual growth averaged 6.7%. All the portents are that during the Tenth Plan period the 
economy will grow at close to 8% per annum. Given that India’s population growth rate 
is much slower than what it used to be three or four decades ago (1.5% in 2004-05 versus 
2.22% in 1971-72
8) this means that the rise in per capita income growth rate from the 
sixties and seventies to current times has been even more marked.  
More formal evidence that the GDP growth series exhibits a structural break at the end of 
the seventies – beginning of the 1980s can be found in Virmani (1997, 2004a), Rodrik 
and Subramanian (2004b), Wallack (2003), and Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2006). 
The latter, for instance, use a regression based least squares approach that does not 
arbitrarily partition the data according to pre-selected break points and identify 1978-79 
as a structural break year for the GDP growth series. These authors challenged the 
standard view held in the 1990s by the public and a large majority of the economists that 
the policy reforms of the early 1990s had caused or played a major role in the growth 
acceleration (views held by for instance Ahluwalia, 2002; Srinivasan and Tendulkar, 
                                                 
7 This changing perception is cited and discussed in Basu (2006b).    
8 Source: Dyson, Cassen and Visaria (2004) Table 2.1. p 20.    8 
2003). A new view emerged, lead by Rodrik and Subramanian (2004a, 2004b), 
Panagariya (2004) and Virmani (2004a), De Long (2003), and Williamson and Zagha 
(2002), that the surge in growth rate in India happened around 1980 and could therefore 











































































































Source: Table 1 
 
While it is difficult to dispute that a rise in growth rate took place before 90s, it is 
possible to argue that there was further acceleration after the nineties reforms, which can 
be attributed to the reforms. Further, we are inclined to argue, as indeed some others have 
done that the growth in the 80s was not of a sustainable nature, since it relied excessively 
on deficit financing and excessive foreign borrowing (Basu, 2004; Panagariya, 2004; 
Srinivasan, 2005).  
To further understand this debate and the components of the post-80s growth let us take a 
look at the results of the growth accounting exercise of Bosworth et al. (2007). The 
objective of growth accounting is to decompose the economic growth rate of a country 
into contributions of different factors. Assuming a certain aggregate production function 
and competitive markets, the method identifies the contribution of the different factors 
(such as labor and physical capital) and a residual, called the Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP).
9 Changes in the TFP represent changes in efficiency and/or changes in production 
technology. Table 4 shows the results of this exercise.  
 
 
                                                 
9 Thereby hinting at the main critique of this approach: that total factor productivity is a residual and as 
such incorporates also all kinds of shocks, such as political turmoil, external shifts and measurement errors.    9 
 
Table 4 








Capital  Land  Education 
Factor 
Productivity 
1960-73  3.3  2  1.3  1.1  -0.2  0.1  0.2 
1973-83  4.2  2.4  1.8  0.9  -0.2  0.3  0.6 
1983-93  5  2.1  2.9  0.9  -0.1  0.3  1.7 
1993-99  7  1.2  5.8  2.4  -0.1  0.4  2.8 
1999-04  6  2.4  3.6  1.2  0.1  0.4  2 
1960-04  4.7  2  2.6  1.2  -0.1  0.3  1.2 
1960-80  3.4  2.2  1.3  1  -0.2  0.2  0.2 
1980-04  5.8  1.9  3.8  1.4  0  0.4  2 
Source: Bosworth et al. (2007): Table 3   
Table 4 shows that the pre-1980 growth is mainly associated with an increase in factors 
while the post 1980 growth is associated with an increase in factors, but more importantly 
an increase in TFP.
10 Looking at the entire time series, they conclude that the TFP growth 
took off around the early 80s, and has shown an increasing trend since then. This finding 
is consistent with other studies on TFP growth (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004b, Virmani 
2004b). Despite the large structural change in the economy (see Table 5), this increase in 
TFP, according to these authors, mainly reflects an improvement of the performance of 
the individual sectors rather than a re-allocation of resources from low-productivity 




Percentage of GDP (at factor costs) by Industry of Origin 
 






















1950-51  59  13  12  7  9 
1960-61  55  17  14  6  9 
1970-71  48  20  16  6  11 
1980-81  40  22  18  7  12 
1990-91  35  24  19  10  12 
2000-01  27  24  22  13  15 
2005-06  23  24  25  13  14 
Source: Economic Survey 2005-2006. Ministry of Finance, Table 1.3 
                                                 
10 Other studies confirm this general trend (see for instance Dholakia, 2002). A more detailed discussion 
can be found in Virmani (2004b). 
11 According to Rodrik and Subramanian (2004b) a structural shift can only explain 10% of the TFP 
growth.    10 
But how did this sudden surge in TFP come about? Rodrik and Subramanian (2004b) 
suggest that even though the reforms of the 80s, which consisted of industrial de-
licensing measures, lowering of tax rates, limited import liberalization, and anti-labor 
policies, were not substantial, this small trigger could have elicited a large response in 
TFP because India was below its production possibility frontier. The increases in TFP 
would in that case just be a reflection of the move towards the frontier rather than a shift 
of the frontier itself.
12 As a whole they see an attitudinal shift towards “pro-business” (in 
contrast to the “pro-market” policies of the 90s) as crucial in explaining the surge in the 
aggregate growth rate and TFP.
13 They share this view with other authors, like 
Panagariya (2004), who see the switch from a ‘positive’ list approach, where restrictions 
are the rule and few exceptions are allowed, in 1980s towards a ‘negative’ list approach 
in the 1990s as crucial.  
Let’s now turn to the disaggregate figures of growth and TFP. Beginning with the 
primary sector, from Table 6 (column 1) it is clear that the growth rate of this sector has 
been extremely volatile. The (arithmetic) average annual growth rate of the entire series 
is 5.5% and the standard deviation is 3.8%. Despite the irregular nature of this time 
series, Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2006) were able to discern a structural break, 
namely a positive break around 1964-65. Notably, this break is situated slightly before 
the onset of the Green Revolution (around 1967-68), which in India mainly consisted of 
the spread of genetically modified rice and wheat varieties. According to them, this 
structural break “may owe something to the steady expansion in irrigated area in the 
decade and half preceding the mid-sixties”.
14 Indeed, given the significance of agriculture 
as a share of GDP in the 1950s-1980s, it seems that a good or a bad year in terms of rains 
can have a large impact on the overall growth rate. Consider for example the GDP growth 
rates of the good years 1958-59, 1967-68, and 1988-89 in Table 6. Virmani (2004a) 
however contests this conventional wisdom and argues that there is no change in the 
impact of rainfall fluctuations on the Indian economy during the last 50 years. As far as 
TFP is concerned, Bosworth et al. (2007) show that, taking 1960 as the index year (1960 
= 1), the growth of TFP in the agriculture sector fluctuates around the index 1 up to the 
mid to late 80s, after which an increasing trend can be discerned. In figures, they find that 
the TFP growth changes from -0.2% per year during 1960-73 to 0.9% per year during 
1973-83, and to 1.2% during 1983-99.  
Despite the fact that the growth figures of the last few years do not seem structurally 
different than the growth figures of the previous decades, there is talk of an agrarian crisis 
in India. This is caused by the declining public investments in agriculture (a trend which 
started in the early 80s), the decline in agriculture as a share of the GDP associated with 
relatively little reallocation of employment (the primary sector contributes 20% of the 
GDP but has a share of 60% of the employment), the fact that poverty in India is a 
                                                 
12 The reforms of the 80s are extensively discussed by, among others, Kohli (2006a), Virmani (2004b) and 
Panagariya (2004).  
13 Rodrik and Subramanian (2004b) claim that they provide evidence for this attitudinal shift by the 
government in the early 1980s that favored the interests of existing businesses rather than new entrants or 
consumers. This evidence has been contested by Srinivasan (2005).  
14 The current gross irrigated area is 40% of the cultivated area. This area has increased a lot over the last 
40 years (see: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, August 2004, Table 14.2).   11 
predominantly rural phenomenon and the rise in farmer suicides, mainly in the states of 
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra (Vaidyanathan, 2006).  
Turning to industry, let us first look at the industry figures in column 2 of Tables 5 and 6. 
The share of the industrial sector has increased over the last 50 years from 13% at the 
time of independence to 24%. As such the structure of the economy is nowadays of a 
very different nature in India than in China where industry represents nearly 50% of the 
economy. The time series in column 2, Table 6, which seems at first sight quite volatile, 
has an (arithmetic) average of approximately 6% and a standard deviation of 2.9%. 
According to Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2006), the manufacturing series exhibits 
three structural breaks. The first negative structural break is in the mid-sixties. The 
second positive structural break is in 1982-83, and the third negative structural break is in 
1994-95. They interpret these figures as evidence against the hypothesis that 
manufacturing had led the acceleration in the GDP growth rate at the beginning of the 
80s. Virmani (2004a) however comes to the exact opposite conclusion: “this (analysis) 
shows that the growth rate of manufacturing accelerated after 1980-81. This contributed 
to the acceleration of the rate of growth of GDP from 1981”. And the debate does not end 
there. According to Bosworth et al. (2007), the TFP growth of industry is slowing down, 
not accelerating, during the post reform period. They conclude that “these results are 
disappointing in light of the attention that has been devoted to the on-going liberalization 
of the trade and regulatory regimes for goods production.” Their conclusions related to 
manufacturing are very similar to the ones for industry as a whole. They, among others, 
thereby provide counter-evidence to the studies of Ahluwalia (1995) and Unel (2003) 
who concluded that manufacturing experienced a surge of productivity in the 1980s. 
Goldar and Mitra (2002) take the more skeptical line that these differences in findings 
can be attributed to a variety of measurement issues.    
Finally, let us take a look at the service sector figures in the remaining columns of Tables 
5 and 6. Table 6 shows that, since the 80s, the services have shown a more consistent 
higher annual growth rate than the industrial and the agricultural sectors of the economy.  
Bosworth et al. (2007) show that according to their growth accounting analysis this 
increase in growth rate is mainly due to an increase in TFP. This is rather puzzling as 
services are normally considered as an area of limited productivity growth. They suggest 
a number of explanations for this phenomenon such as an incorrect measurement of the 
prices in the service industry. Srinivasan (2005) even suggests that the higher wages in 
the public sector might be driving a spurious increasing TFP. This is clearly an area 
which needs further research.  
Given the predominance of the services in the Indian economy (see Table 5), namely 
52% of the GDP in 2005-06, several authors have concluded that this sector is driving the 
current growth India witnesses. According to the analysis of Balakrishnan and 
Parameswaran (2006), services have led the acceleration in the growth of GDP in India in 
the late seventies – early eighties (see, also, Babu, 2005). In this regard also, the growth 
in India is of a very different nature from the growth in China, where services contribute 
only 33.2% to the GDP (Panagariya, 2004). As only 23% of the population is employed 
in India’s service sector and the growth in employment in this sector has been low, many 
scholars have concluded that India is caught in the groove of ‘jobless growth’. While the   12 
growth in employment need not match the growth in each the sector, the discrepancy 
between the contribution of the primary sector to the GDP (20%) and its share in the 
workforce (60% of the population) is indeed worrisome.  
 
Table 6 
Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP at Factor Cost by Industry of Origin 
 





















1951-52  1.8  4.5  2.7  2.3  3 
1952-53  3.1  0.1  3.2  4.2  2.1 
1953-54  7.5  6.4  3.7  1.4  3.1 
1954-55  3  8.6  6.4  3.7  3.6 
1955-56  -0.8  11.2  7.3  4  3.1 
Average  2.9  6.1  4.6  3.1  3.0 
1956-57  5.4  8.8  7.4  1.6  3.8 
1957-58  -4.2  -1  3.3  3.8  4.5 
1958-59  9.9  7.1  5.1  2.8  4.1 
1959-60  -0.8  7.1  6.3  3.8  4.3 
Average  2.5  5.6  5.3  3.0  3.9 
1960-61  7.0  10.5  8.5  2.1  4.9 
1961-62  0.3  7.2  6.5  4.3  4.7 
1962-63  -1.5  6.4  6.0  3.4  7.1 
1963-64  2.4  10.6  7.1  3.1  6.6 
1964-65  8.9  7.3  6.7  2.7  6.6 
Average  3.3  8.4  7.0  3.1  6.0 
1965-66  -10.2  3.0  2.0  3.0  4.0 
1966-67  -1.3  3.4  2.6  1.8  4.6 
1967-68  14.3  3.1  4.4  2.7  3.9 
1968-69  0.0  5.2  4.6  4.9  4.5 
1969-70  6.4  8.1  5.4  4.2  5.5 
Average  1.5  4.5  3.8  3.3  4.5 
1970-71  6.5  1.8  4.8  4.2  5.5 
1971-72  -1.7  2.7  2.3  5.2  4.5 
1972-73  -4.6  3.5  2.5  3.9  3.3 
1973-74  6.9  1.1  4.2  2.4  2.6 
1974-75  -1.3  1.3  6.2  -0.3  4.7 
Average  1.1  2.1  4.0  3.1  4.1 
1975-76  12.9  6.1  9.0  6.9  3.5 
1976-77  -5.4  9.3  4.6  7.9  2.8 
1977-78  9.7  7.2  6.4  4.9  2.7 
1978-79  2.3  8.0  8.1  7.1  4.3 
1979-80  -12.2  -3.4  -0.4  1.0  7.3 
Average  1.0  5.3  5.5  5.5  4.1 
1980-81  12.9  4.0  5.7  1.9  4.1 
1981-82  5.7  7.4  6.2  8.3  2.6 
1982-83  0.0  2.9  4.6  10.4  8.0   13 
1983-84  9.1  8.7  4.9  10.0  3.9 
1984-85  1.5  6.2  5.1  8.5  6.8 
Average  5.7  5.8  5.3  7.8  5.1 
1985-86  1.0  4.7  7.9  10.2  6.5 
1986-87  0.2  6.2  5.9  11.3  7.0 
1987-88  -1.0  7.0  5.2  8.4  7.2 
1988-89  15.4  8.6  6.0  11.4  6.4 
1989-90  1.9  10.7  7.4  12.6  8.3 
Average  3.3  7.4  6.5  10.8  7.1 
1990-91  4.6  7.4  4.9  7.7  4.1 
1991-92  -1.1  -1.0  2.5  12.0  2.6 
1992-93  5.4  4.3  5.6  5.9  4.6 
1993-94  3.9  5.6  7.1  13.4  3.5 
1994-95  5.3  10.3  10.4  5.6  3.2 
Average  3.6  5.3  6.1  8.9  3.6 
1995-96  -0.3  12.3  13.3  8.2  7.9 
1996-97  8.8  7.7  7.8  7.0  6.3 
1997-98  -1.5  3.8  7.8  11.6  11.7 
1998-99  5.9  3.8  7.7  7.4  10.4 
1999-00  0.6  4.9  8.5  10.6  12.2 
Average  2.6  6.5  9.0  8.9  9.7 
2000-01  0.2  6.7  7.1  4.1  4.7 
2001-02  5.8  2.8  9.2  7.3  3.9 
2002-03  -5.6  6.8  9.1  8.0  3.8 
2003-04  9.6  7.9  12.0  4.5  5.4 
2004-05  1.2  8.9  10.6  9.2  9.2 
Average  2.1  6.6  9.6  6.6  5.4 
Source: Economic Survey 2005-2006. Ministry of Finance, Table 1.6. From 2001-02 new series at 1999-
2000 prices. Before 2001-02 at 1993-94 prices. Averages: authors’ own calculations.  
 
As illustrated in the previous section, despite its limitations, growth accounting can 
provide some insight into the approximate causes of growth. In addition, other techniques 
such as growth regressions are often employed to analyse the impacts of the immediate 
causes, such as quantity and quality of labor and capital as well as the ‘fundamental 
determinants’ of growth. It is, however, important to note that both methods have been 
heavily criticised in the literature.
15  
Without going into the technical details of these debates, let us conclude this section by 
taking a look at these ‘fundamental determinants of growth’ for the Indian case. Most 
scholars seem to agree on the fundamental determinants of growth: physical and human 
capital investments, quality of institutions or governance, and investment climate.  While 
the gross domestic capital formation ratio (33% - see Table 1) is rather high, India’s low 
literacy rate (61%) could potentially become a constraint on India’s long term growth 
prospects. And what about India’s institutions and investment climate?  
                                                 
15 See for instance Durlauf et al. (2004). See also Bosworth and Collins (2003) for additional references on 
these critiques.    14 
In order to answer this question, we took a look at the World Bank’s ‘ease of business’ 
indicator, which can be viewed as a measure of investment climate. This indicator ranks 
economies in terms of their ‘ease of business’, from 1 to 175, with 1 referring to the best. 
This index averages the country's percentile rankings on 10 categories, giving equal 
weight to each category. Each category in its turn averages the country’s percentile 
rankings on different sub-categories.
16 According to the latest indicators, India ranks 134 
out of 175 and is situated around the average rank of low-income countries, above the 
majority of the Sub-Saharan African countries and below most South and South-East 
Asian and Latin American developing countries. From Table 7, one can see that India 
ranks relatively high in the ‘getting credit’ and ‘protecting investors’ spheres, but 
particularly low in the areas of ‘dealing with licenses’, ‘paying taxes’ and ‘enforcing 
contracts’. In these areas, as well as in the areas of ‘employing workers’ and ‘closing a 
business’, most analysts would agree that further reforms are needed.  
 
Table 7 
Cross Country Comparison of Ease of Business Indicators (2006) 
 
  Average Rank   














Starting a Business  116  98  71  45  88 
Dealing with Licenses  115  94  75  49  155 
Employing Workers  107  85  81  70  112 
Registering Property  113  96  76  48  110 
Getting Credit  121  80  69  32  65 
Protecting Investors  94  96  67  50  33 
Paying Taxes  105  101  75  52  158 
Trading Across Borders
1  130  96  71  30  139 
Enforcing Contracts  111  95  91  39  173 
Closing a Business  117  94  87  26  133 
Overall rank  133  97  67  27  134 
GNI per capita ($)  436  2037  6431  30763  720 
Source: Doing Business 2007. World Bank. Notes (1) the ‘trading across borders’ measure does not include 
tariffs or trade taxes. 
 
The ‘dealing with licenses’ indicator is of particular interest in the Indian case as it is 
often viewed as a residue of the license raj that characterised India before the 1980s 
(Aghion et al., 2006).
17 According the World Bank figures, India has not improved much 
                                                 
16 Note that the World Bank figures consider only the official costs and times involved for a standardized 
firm, assuming perfect knowledge about the procedures, these measures most likely underestimate the real 
costs involved. In addition, the rankings do not take into account that the opportunity cost of time differs 
across countries; 1 day waiting in India is not the same as one day waiting in the US. On a similar note, as 
the GNI is much higher in the High Income countries, a low cost as a % of the GNI is in a way ‘easier’ to 
achieve; also as this cost is not calculated as a % of the PPP GNI, the actual perceived costs in developing 
countries might be lower than is suggested by the World Bank figures. It is unclear how these data issues 
affect the relative ranking of the countries.  
17 Some, first-hand descriptive accounts of India’s burgeoning bureaucracy occur in Basu (2007b).    15 
over the last two years. In India one needs on average 270 days to complete all the 
procedures required to build a standardised warehouse in the construction industry, this is 
considerably higher than the average of the Low Income countries (231 days). India’s 
cost measure of this indicator gives a slightly more optimistic picture. Obtaining the 
necessary licenses to build the warehouse costs 606% (of the GNI per capita), which is in 
between the averages of the Low Income countries (996%) and the Lower-Middle 
Income countries (558%).        
 
Many scholars have argued that India’s performance is surprisingly low when compared 
to the quality of its institutions.
18  Rodrik and Subramanian (2004b), for instance, using 
geography, openness, economic and political institutes as fundamental determinants of 
growth, conclude that ‘India’s level of income was about a quarter of what it should be 
given the strength of its economic institutions. On the other hand, if political institutions 
are the true long-run determinant of income, India’s income is about 15 percent of what it 
should be. India has thus been a significant under-achiever in the sense that it has not 
exploited the potential created by having done the really hard work of building 
institutions.’ In their analysis they used settler mortality, fraction of the population 
speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe, or fraction of the population 
speaking English as an instrument for institutions, as described in Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi (2002). 
 
 
III. GROWTH, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
The previous section gave an overview of India’s growth performance over the last 50 
years and briefly outlined the elements of the current debate in the literature on India’s 
growth performance. This section tells the story behind the figures.  
The first real big growth year for India, 1975-76, was also one that stood out politically as 
one of the most salient, if not notorious, year for the nation. That year the country’s GDP 
grew by 9%, a figure that has been surpassed only twice since then
19. That was also the 
year in which the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, declared an Emergency and 
established dictatorial control over the nation. This would last for two years. In 1977 
Indira Gandhi called an election. There is no way of knowing if this was prompted by an 
exaggerated sense of popularity on her part or because of a genuine fatigue she felt with 
totalitarian control. But the fact of the matter is that she was routed at the polls, and she 
would return to power (re-elected) only in 1980.  
Some of the growth spurt of the early Emergency period would get undone in 1979-80, 
the worst performing year in the history of independent India, but 1974 to 1979, as 
already noted, was nevertheless to be the cross-over plan period when average annual 
growth rate breached the 5% mark. 
                                                 
18 See for instance Srinivasan (2005). 
19 One of these is the current year, 2006-07, the growth rate for which is estimated to be 9.2%.    16 
Thanks to the totalitarian embarrassment of 1975, most Indian commentators are loathe 
to identify that year as a break in the trend for the economy.
20 Yet there is no denying that 
it was, even though the sustainability of that growth impulse may be questionable. The 
next improvement would come in the early 1980s, when not only did the growth rate pick 
up further but, as pointed out above, the country broke ranks with other nations. The next 
change, which in our opinion was the big and sustainable change and is often thought of 
as a structural break, occurred in 1991, when, pushed by a macroeconomic crisis, itself 
caused by the first Gulf war and drying up of foreign reserves, Indian undertook the most 
major reforms since independence
21. 
If these are the three landmark years—and clearly this matches reasonably well with the 
statistical analysis, what were the factors that led to them?  There were important policy 
changes true, but what does not always get adequate credit in the case of India are the two 
closely-related variables that are identified in standard growth theory as among the most 
significant factors—the savings and investment rates
22. These rates, which were 
traditionally very low in India, around 15% till the late sixties, began climbing all through 
the seventies and crossed the 20% mark in 1978-79. This must have contributed to the 
greater growth momentum of the mid-seventies, and in fact the persistent growth that we 
have seen since the early eighties. The extra spike in the year 1975-76 did probably owe 
something to the Emergency. Trains do run on time in the first flush of dictatorship and 
there is anecdotal evidence that this and other work-related efficiencies were adopted in 
that year. But that first flush soon vanished and thanks to severe shortages in 
infrastructural resources, the economy too slowed down severely by the end of the 
seventies.  
A natural question that arises is: What caused the rising savings rate? Unfortunately, this 
question has not received sufficient attention and no clear answer to this is available. It 
seems to us however that it had something to do with the nationalization of banks that 
Indira Gandhi announced in 1969
23. After the nationalization, the banks were forced to 
open branches in remote, ‘unprofitable’ areas. This, coupled with the impetus that came 
with the formation of the state-owned Unit Trust of India in 1964, may have prompted 
greater savings by making savings easier and safe (Shetty, 2007). Table 8 shows that 
there was indeed a phenomenal increase in the number of bank branches in India, 
following the nationalization; so some prima facie evidence for this hypothesis is indeed 
there.   
                                                 
20 To the extent that the value of democracy is not purely instrumental but as an end in itself, over 1975-77 
must overall go down as dark years in India’s history. For a discussion of India’s democracy and 
development, see Sen (2004).  
21 Why the Indian reforms came so late and only when the nation was pushed against the wall is itself an 
interesting question. It may have something to do with India’s democracy which is quite unique. All the 
currently-developed democratic nations adopted democracy with universal suffrage, after the process on 
industrialization was firmly in place. India adopted universal suffrage at independence, at a level of poverty 
with few parallels; and so it has had to contend with the opinion of the poor in ways that are quite alien to 
the industrialized nations of today (Varshney, 2007). This may also have something to do with the tenacity 
of India’s labor laws discussed below.   
22 See Majumdar (1997) for discussion of growth theory in the context of the Indian economy. 
23 The Supreme Court of India initially declared the nationalization to be not valid. But Indira Gandhi 
amended the law and passed the nationalization decision by an ordinance.   17 
The opening of branches and making savings and borrowing outlets available to poorer 
citizens was an explicit objective of the nationalization
24. And while its impact on savings 
awaits formal investigation, there are other kinds of related studies that do suggest a large 
impact of the nationalization of banks on ordinary citizens
25. Burgess and Pande (2005), 
for instance, test whether this large state-led bank branch expansion program was 
associated with poverty reduction in India, given that an integral element of this program 
was branch expansion into rural unbanked locations. The paper's main finding is that 
branch expansion into rural unbanked locations in India significantly reduced rural 
poverty. It seems natural to expect that such a large banking initiative did cause a boost in 
savings, especially since it coincided with the rise in India’s savings rate.  
Another reason for the increasing savings rate could be the increasing real interest rate 
(Table 9). These are positive and show an increasing trend since 1974. Yet, most detailed 
studies of savings find a rather weak connection between interest rates and savings (Rao, 
2007; Shome, 2007), suggesting that consumers are more interested in long-run prospects 
and the facilities for saving than the immediate lure of interest. As Shome (p.464) 
remarks, “But it is clearly the growth in financial intermediation that stands out most as 
the main driver of savings.”   
 
Table 8 
Number of Bank Branches in India (Scheduled and Non-Scheduled Commercial 
Banks) 
 
Year  Number 
1941  2074
(1) 
1951  4119 
1961  5113 
1969  9051 
1971  12985 
1976  23656 
1981  38047 
1986  53397 
1991  62740 
1996  64937 
2001  67856 
2005  70324 
Source: Statistical Tables Related to Banks in India, 2005-2006 and previous issues. Reserve Bank of 
India, (1) India and Burma (now Myanmar). Note the figures from 1991 onwards are from 31 March, while 
the ones before that date are from 31 December   
 
                                                 
24 “The banking system touches the lives of millions and has to be inspired by larger social purpose and has 
to subserve national priorities and objectives such as rapid growth of agriculture, small industries and 
exports, raising of employment levels, encouragement of new entrepreneurs and development of backward 
areas. For this purpose it is necessary for the government to take direct responsibility for the extension and 
diversification of banking services and for the working of a substantial part of the banking system.” (Bank 
Company Acquisition Act, 1969).  
25 Economic analysis of banking reform is a relatively scarce discipline in India. For recent work, see 
Banerjee, Duflo and Cole (2003, 2004).    18 
Let us look at some statistics on the growth of savings in India. Bosworth et al. (2007) 
report that not only have national savings risen considerably since the 1980’s, but that in 
particular household savings have risen from 10% to 25% of GDP during the last 30 
years. Half of this is in the form of financial savings, which can be channeled back into 
other sectors as investment. Public sector saving, however, has not performed as well. 
From a high of around 4% in the 1970’s, it became negative in the late 1990’s, recovering 
only recently. These trends are noted in Figure 3. Note that savings are reported here as 
percentage of GNP at factor costs. It is also important to note that savings have risen 
particularly in the post-liberalization years. Whether there is a link between higher 
savings and post-liberalization policies needs to be further researched.  
 
Table 9 
Nominal and Real Lending Rates, 1970-2004 
 
Year  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
Nominal lending rate   9  10.4  13.3  13.9  16.7  15.2  11.4 
Inflation rate   15.3  4.7  9.3  6.7  11  5.3  5.2 
Real interest rate  -4.9  5.9  3.9  6.8  5.2  9.4  5.9 
Source: Bosworth et al. (2007), Table 12. 
Note: The nominal lending rate is an average of the rates for four major lending institutions. The inflation 
rate is measured by the annual rate of change in the wholesale price index for all commodities. 
 
To conclude, the rise in India’s savings rate deserves more detailed investigation than has 
occurred thus far. Given that India is currently in the midst of another sharp rise in 
savings (the first since the late seventies), this is a subject of contemporary relevance.   
 
Figure 3 
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Source: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy. 2006. Reserve Bank of India (Table 10 and Table 
1). Notes: old series (base: 1993-94) used for calculation.     19 
The second acceleration—in the early 1980s probably owes something to altered policies 
and of course it came with a background of higher investment and savings rates. The 
change in policy regime makes for interesting political sleuthing. It seems to have much 
to do with Indira Gandhi’s altered perceptions. The reading of descriptive accounts of her 
regime (for instance, Dhar, 2000; Frank 2002) suggests that unlike her father, Nehru, 
India’s first Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi never had strong convictions about economic 
policy. Her early commitment to ‘socialism’ was arguably prompted by an instinctive 
following of her father’s convictions and policies, without any deep convictions of her 
own. She nationalized banks, established control over grain trade as homage to her father 
without a coherent plan for the whole economy as such. 
By the mid-seventies she was under the influence of another man—her younger son, 
Sanjay Gandhi. Sanjay was not committed to any well thought out ideology but was wary 
of Congress socialism. What was notable about him was his vaulting ambition and, along 
with his entrepreneurial friends, he pushed India towards crony capitalism. There has 
been much that has been written about his disproportionate influence on his mother. In an 
interview that he gave in July 1976, he openly criticized the Communist Party of India 
(an ally of Indira Gandhi) and disparaged earlier policies of the Congress. Mrs. Gandhi 
was upset by the interview and summoned P. N. Dhar, who headed her secretariat, and 
told him, “Sanjay has done something terrible and I am upset.” (Dhar, 2000, p. 325) The 
conversation that followed where she asked Dhar to do the damage control suggested to 
him that she was “afraid of” his “displeasure.” As time progressed and she felt more and 
more isolated from her own party and other politicians, she turned increasingly to her 
son, who had visions, without wisdom, of an entrepreneurial revolution, mainly under the 
ownership of him and his friends
26.     
By the early eighties India started out on a path of openly capitalist development. Even 
though this was done with no systematic vision and with favours doled out to those close 
to the government, it boosted growth, as the statistical analysis above shows. The 
economy had for so long been shackled by bureaucratic rules and red tape that the release 
from these, however small, caused a rise in growth. Moreover, by now India had higher 
investment and savings rates to support this. 
By the late eighties, even though the country was growing fast, it was beginning to 
borrow heavily from its future, which makes us believe that the growth impulse of the 
eighties would not have been sustainable without sharp changes in policy. The fiscal 
deficit was growing, international debt was reaching record levels and the debt-service 
ratio had reached become untenable. The meltdown happened in the 1990-91. The first 
Gulf War was the proximate cause but the bubble was anyway ready to burst. Huge 
amounts have been written on this crisis
27 and we will not go into that here. But the crisis 
became an impetus for economic reform. By 1991 government had changed hands. 
Narasimha Rao was Prime Minister and Manmohan Singh was his Finance Minister. 
Under their stewardship a reform started, more far-reaching than any since the early days 
of Nehru’s government. Industrial licensing was discarded and the astronomical import 
                                                 
26 Sanjay Gandhi died when a plane that he was flying crashed on 23 June 1980. 
27 See, for instance, Desai (1994), Srinivasan (2000), Ahluwalia (2002), Bardhan (2004), Basu (2004) and 
Chidambaram (2007).     20 
tariff rates were set on a sharp downward course. The first two years of the reform were a 
difficult time for the economy. But in terms of overall growth rate and performance in the 
international sector the Indian economy has not looked back since then. From 1994 to 
1997 the economy grew at a rate of above 7% for three successive years, slowing down a 
little after that as a result of the general East Asian crisis; but over the last few years the 
growth rate has picked up again. It has not dropped below 7.5% per annum since 2003 
and has thrice crossed the 8% mark. What has been powering this new growth and was 
the big success of the reforms was the international sector. India’s foreign exchange 
balance started rising from a precarious low in 1991, when the country was on the verge 
of default to a very comfortable level. As Table 10 shows the reserves had fluctuated but 
on balance remained low for several decades, up to 1990. Since then, with the reforms 
marking an excellent dummy variable, it has grown sharply. Currently, India is among 
the world’s five largest foreign reserve holders.  
 
Table 10 
Foreign Exchange Reserves in India, Selected Years 
 




of Goods and Services 
($ millions) 
Short-Term Debt, 
(as % of Foreign 
Reserves) 
Debt-Service Ratio 
1977  5,824       
1990  5,834  18,477  129  35 
1994  25,186  26,855  14  26 
1998  32,490  34,298  16  18 
2002  75,428  52,512  10  14 
2005  130,000  68,000  5.7  6.2 
Source:  Economic Survey (various), Ministry of Finance, Government of India; and Press Releases of the 
Ministry of Commerce. 
Even exports have risen, especially when one includes software and information-
technology-related invisibles within exports.
28 According to World Bank figures (see 
Figure 4) exports, as percentage of GDP, crossed 10% for the first time in 1992 and are 
currently over 19%.  With the rise in foreign exchange balance and the confidence of 
success in the software and pharmaceuticals sector, Indian corporations have gone on a 
spree of buying international companies, an activity unheard of ten years ago. It is this 
international presence and visibility that has given India the somewhat disproportionate 
global media attention. But that in itself is an advantage since it has boosted confidence 
in the country, pouring money into the Indian bourses, and become partly self-fulfilling. 
While the economic reforms of 1991-93 lie behind the international success of the 
country, there is more to the story, especially over the last four or five years and this, 
once again, intertwines with politics, this time global politics.  
There are two factors worth drawing attention to
29. First, there was one unintended 
positive spillover of the last US presidential election. During the election campaign, 
                                                 
28 For an analysis of India’s success in software and information technology, see Kapur (2002) and Murthy 
(2004).  
29 A more detailed discussion of this occurs in Basu (2006b).   21 
outsourcing back office work to developing countries came under heavy criticism, with 
some television shows, such as that of Lou Dobbs, attacking U.S. entrepreneurs for 
profiteering by outsourcing work. This had a huge advertisement effect for the 
advantages of outsourcing. Most poor countries would not be able to afford such 
advertising on American television; they suddenly got this for free. Small U.S. 
entrepreneurs, who were unaware of this profit opportunity, learned about it and began 
outsourcing and India’s already large outsourcing business received another boost.  
 
Figure 4 
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Source: World Development Indicators 2006, World Bank  
Second, having an alignment of interest with the world’s most powerful nation, the U.S., 
can have large benefits for an economy. We have seen this happen in the case of South 
Korea since the fifties. Shifts in global geo-political balance of power have suddenly 
brought India into the ambit of U.S. interest. As long as America’s main foreign policy 
concern was Communism and the USSR, it had little use for India. But now with 
terrorism being the main global concern of the US, it has shared interests with India, 
which are deeper than the tactical ties currently with Pakistan. Also, with the rise of 
China, the U.S. has apprehensions of a new unipolar world with China at the centre or, 
what is only marginally better, a direct face off with China in a bipolar world. In the 
event of a showdown between these two countries, the risks for the U.S. are huge. If 
China cuts off or monitors trade flows through the Strait of Malacca, the biggest sea route 
for trade in today’s world, this can have very large consequences for the American 
economy. China also has a disproportionate leverage on the value of the dollar, thanks to 
its large foreign exchange holdings. India is viewed by the United States as a   22 
counterpoise for all these risks, and India’s economy has benefited from this emerging 
geo-political advantage.
30   
But we want to turn now from these macroeconomic aggregates and broad global issues 
to the microeconomic foundations of what is happening in India. The advantages of 
global politics can easily be dissipated, as we saw in the case of the former Soviet Union, 
if a country’s economic ‘nuts and bolts’ do not function well. There is now increasing 
data on the microeconomic institutions that permit businesses to thrive and grow and play 
a crucial role in an economy’s long-run trajectory. The next section examines some of 
these issues. 
IV.   MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 
India’s initial focus on the international sector has paid off handsomely. But to sustain 
this growth microeconomic issues need greater attention—better distribution of income, 
improved labor market functioning, the control of corruption, and more efficient 
institutions for business and enterprise. These are often referred to as second generation 
reforms. There is no effort here to cover all these microfoundational issues, each of which 
can be the subject of a full-length paper, but to comment on one, namely, labor-market 
regulation, on which we have insights to offer, which are not common wisdom.   
While the Indian economy is booming, there is evidence that workers are not partaking in 
the boom adequately. Employment is not growing as fast as working age population, nor 
are wages rising as rapidly as per capita income. There are many reasons for this—some 
to do with forces of globalization that are beyond the Indian government’s policy reach. 
But much of it has to do with the ‘culture’ that pervades India’s labour markets, which in 
turn is a consequence of the complicated and ill-conceived laws that govern the labour 
market.  
In India there are 45 laws at the national level and close to four times that at the level of 
state governments that monitor the functioning of labour markets. This complexity gets 
reflected in the World Bank’s Ease of Business Indicators, where India ranks 112 out of 
175 countries in the category ‘employing workers’ in 2006 (with 1 referring to the best). 
Even though recent changes in the regulation of several Indian states have resulted in a 
lower ‘difficulty of hiring index’, ‘rigidity of hours index’, ‘rigidity of employment 
index’ and ‘firing costs’,  India still scores high on the ‘difficulty of firing’ index 
(70/100), which is considerably higher than the average of the Low Income countries 
(44/100).   
Some of these labor laws date back to the nineteenth century. They were meant to control 
conflict and keep the labour market efficient. Unfortunately, the experience has been to 
the contrary. According to recent World Bank estimates, in 2004, there were 482 cases of 
major work stoppages, resulting in 15 million human days of work loss (World Bank, 
2006). Between 1995 and 2001 around 9% of factory workers were involved in these 
                                                 
30 Interestingly, Indo-Chinese relations have also improved steadily since Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 
1989; and trade between India and China has grown exponentially over the last four years (see Ramesh 
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stoppages. The figure for China is close to zero. On the other hand, the wages of Chinese 
workers are rising much faster than those of India’s. These facts, we would argue, are not 
unrelated.  
Most of India’s labour laws were crafted with scant respect for ‘market response.’  If X 
seemed bad, the presumption was that you had to simply enact a law banning X. But the 
fact that each law leads entrepreneurs and labourers to respond strategically, often in 
complicated ways, was paid no heed. In a poor country no one with any sensitivity wants 
workers to lose their jobs. So what does one do? The instinct is to make it difficult for 
firms to layoff workers. That is exactly what India’s Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, did, 
especially through the amendments of 1976 and 1982, for firms in the formal sector and 
employing more than 100 workers. 
But in today’s globalised world, with volatile and shifting demand, firms have responded 
to this by keeping their labour force as small as possible. It is little wonder that in a 
country as large as India less than 10 million workers are employed in the formal private 
sector. Some commentators have argued that India’s labour laws could not have had 
much of a consequence since most of them apply to only the formal sector. What they fail 
to realize is that one reason the formal sector has remained miniscule is because of these 
laws and also the culture that these laws have spawned (Basu, 2006a).  
Several recent studies have analyzed the impacts of labor regulations on firm 
productivity, patterns of specialization and technological progress. According to Besley 
and Burgess (2004), increasing pro-worker regulation has a negative impact on 
investment and productivity in the registered manufacturing sectors. What is also 
interesting about their findings is the lack of evidence that such policies improve labor 
interests. Aghion and Burgess (2003) confirm these results and in addition show that the 
negative impact of having stricter labor regulations on productivity has increased in the 
period post-liberalization. Kochar et al (2006), based on their analysis of the patterns of 
specialization of Indian firms, suggest that not only is the level of productivity of existing 
firms affected by stringent regulations, but new firms are either kept from entering as a 
result.  
What is needed in India is not a law that allows employers to fire workers at will but one 
that allows for different kinds of contracts. Some workers may sign a contract for a high 
wage but one that requires them to quit at short notice; others may seek the opposite. This 
would allow firms to employ different kinds of labour depending on the volatility of the 
market they operated in. 
Much of the debate on labour laws has been misconstrued. What is needed is not change 
in labour laws and policy to elicit sacrifice from organized labour, as some economists 
have suggested. Indian workers, whether they be in the organized sector or the 
unorganized sector, are too poor for that. The need is for changes in order to create 
greater private-sector demand for labour, which will boost wages and employment. We 
believe that India’s poorly construed labor laws have been so persistent because of an 
intellectual failure, to wit, the inability to grasp that it may be in the worker’s own 
interest (in some contexts) to have the right to waive some rights that have been granted 
to the worker.    24 
 
It should be clarified that we are not making the case to give all workers the right to give 
up their right to call strikes or the right to continue to work, but simply arguing that there 
are contexts where it is worthwhile giving them the meta right to give up some right. One 
has to weigh lots of pros and cons before making a general recommendation. We feel that 
the right to strike has other advantages so that, barring some very special cases, workers 
should always have this right. On the other hand, we believe that in India workers should 
be given the right to sign contracts with different kinds of firing or retrenchment rules 
and that, doing so, is likely to cause such a rise in aggregate demand for labor that all 
workers will be better off. While much of the current debate in India on labor laws is 
conducted as though worker interests are pitted against business interests, in reality, it is 
between thinking clearly and not thinking clearly.       
It should also be added that flexibility in hiring and firing is not the only problem. India’s 
complex web of legislation leads to a system of dispute resolution that is incredibly slow. 
Data from the Ministry of Labour reveal that in the year 2000 there were 533,038 
disputes pending in India’s labour courts; and of these 28,864 had been pending for over 
10 years. If India is to be a vibrant global economy, this has to change.  
In brief, the need is to move to a system that (1) makes room for more flexible contracts 
in the labour market, (2) has a minimal welfare net for workers who are out of work, and 
(3) resolves labour market disputes more quickly. 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
To conclude, if India wants to sustain and raise even higher its current growth the main 
bottlenecks in the Indian economy will need to be addressed. These are infrastructure 
(roads, expensive freight rates, power supply, ports and airports), labor and bankruptcy 
regulations, and the high level of corruption in the government bureaucracy. In addition, 
the current erratic and low growth pattern of the agricultural sector, and the rising 
inequality, between states, between rural-urban areas, and within urban and rural areas 
mainly since the 1990s, are a concern.  
 
Of these numerous factors, we had occasion to address only a few in this paper. Each of 
these deserves inquiry, research and policy initiative, but in concluding we will just 
remark briefly on one of them--the subject of inequality.  
 
Comparing the ratio of the income share of the richest 10% over the poorest 10% in India 
with other countries, one may be tempted to conclude that inequality in India is not 
abnormally high. According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2006, 
this ratio is 7.2 in India (in 2000), compared to 18.36 in China (in 2001), 48 in Guatemala 
(in 2002) and 15.9 in the US (in 2000). As such, India’s current inequality seems to be 
low and comparable to some of the Western European nations. But one has to remember 
that a poor country will have a natural tendency for greater equality, since people cannot 
survive below a certain level of income. To take an extreme case, a country that has a per 
capita income equal to the subsistence income will, by definition, have no income   25 
inequality. Hence, despite the seemingly encouraging inequality ratio mentioned above, 
inequality—especially when it results in higher poverty--is a serious problem for India. 
This can lead to political tensions and can destabilise the otherwise optimistic growth 
scenario. But, even if it does not dampen the country’s growth prospects, it seems to us 
that greater equity and the reduction of poverty are valuable ends in themselves. Indeed it 
is arguable that growth is valuable precisely because it enables a country to banish 
poverty and achieve greater equality. India’s trajectory over the last fifteen years has been 
remarkable, but there will be reason to truly celebrate this when the overall gains filter 
down to the poorest and the most deprived sections of India’s vast population.    
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